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I.  The Problem 
A.  Growth of the U.S. Economy During the Golden Era of "Patient 
Capital" 
Over the past four decades, the U.S. economy has experienced major 
shifts.  Those shifts, in turn, have resulted in seismic changes in American 
(and particularly Delaware) corporate statutory and fiduciary law.  From the 
end of World War II through the 1960s, the U.S. economy remained on a 
steady and steep growth curve, and American corporate enterprises as a 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware.  This Lecture was delivered at the 
Washington and Lee University School of Law on February 24, 2011.  Justice Jacobs has 
spent seventeen years as a practicing corporate litigator, eighteen years as a trial judge on the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, and eight years as a Justice on the Delaware Supreme Court.  
Through his extensive experience, Justice Jacobs has become a specialist in corporate law, 
particularly corporate takeovers and governance. 
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whole generated wealth in a stable, steep-curved way.  This period, from 
1945 to 1975, was the "golden era" of American economic prosperity.1 
That state of affairs was both reflected in, and supported by, the then-
state of American corporate law at that time.  To use a simplistic metaphor, 
during that post-war period, American corporations were the dog and the 
capital markets were the tail.  That is, the focus and time horizon of both 
corporate managements and investors was on long-term, stable growth, 
with the growth of the company being primary and any increase in the 
value of stockholders’ investments being secondary.  During this period, the 
mindset of the business communities, managements, and investors alike 
reflected a tacit societal consensus and recognition that the innovation and 
development of new products would take time, typically five years or more, 
before the company would realize a profit.  As a corollary, it was also 
recognized that the capital investment needed to develop those products 
also required a parallel period during which investors would have to 
patiently "sit still" before they would realize a return on their investment.  
Today, unfortunately, the exact reverse of that ethos and mindset prevails in 
this country.  The capital markets are now the dog, and the corporations that 
create the wealth that, in turn, generates investment capital are the tail.  This 
Lecture will focus, in part, upon how this came to be. 
Although the term was not coined during the golden era—indeed, it 
was not coined until a few years ago—this tolerant mindset for raising and 
investing capital during this golden period is described as "patient capital."2  
That descriptive term is to be contrasted with the opposite metaphor that 
describes the world that exists today:  "impatient" or "activist investor" 
capital.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., George Ross, Labor Versus Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 78, 80–83 (2000). 
 2. That term, which I encountered for the first time in 2010, has been defined as 
effective control of a company by "some set of insiders" with the "incentive and capacity to 
monitor management’s performance," but who "are not dependent on short-term, publicly 
available performance metrics to do so."  PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND 
BUSINESS POWER; CORPORATE CONTROL IN EUROPE AND JAPAN 26 (2011).  Microsoft and 
Google are two examples of "companies with large shareholders whose controlling interest 
in the company gives its managers patient capital."  Id. at 26–27. 
 3. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2008) (describing activist investors as "willing to mount public 
relations campaigns, initiate litigation, and launch proxy battles to pressure corporate 
officers . . . into following their preferred business strategy"); Neil Gunningham & Joseph 
Rees, Industry Self-Regulation:  An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 376 
(1997) (describing impatient capital as when "funds supplied by external capital providers 
move rapidly from company to company, usually based on perceptions of opportunities for 
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During this twenty-five year post-war period, the stability of U.S. (and 
particularly Delaware) corporate law both reflected and supported the 
stability of the corporate and capital markets.  During that time, unlike 
today, corporate shareholders were, by and large, passive retail or "end-
user" investors like your parents and grandparents.4  Those "mom and pop" 
shareholders by and large left the corporation’s managers alone to grow the 
firm over the long-term.  With relatively few exceptions, no one pressured 
corporate managements to run their companies from quarter to quarter to 
meet the expectations of stock analysts or institutional shareholders,5 and 
only rarely were there efforts to pressure managers to manage for the short-
term by threatening to oust them from office.  
To be sure, it was possible even then to oust an incumbent board from 
control, but the tool for doing so was the proxy contest,6 which was a costly 
and risky process and, therefore, infrequently used.  Tender offers7 made 
that job easier, but that tool did not develop until shortly before the end of 
the golden era.  So, during the so-called golden era, there was no "market 
for corporate control" as that term is currently understood.8  As a result, 
during this period corporate law was largely static, quiescent, and typically 
management friendly.  Indeed, nothing short of an outright, demonstrable 
                                                                                                                 
near-term appreciation" (citations omitted)). 
 4. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face:  Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates 
Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 12 (2010) (defining end-user investors as 
individuals "saving primarily for two purposes, to put their kids through college and to fund 
their own retirements"). 
 5. See Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of Institutional 
Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 376, 376 n.2 (1992) (defining 
institutional investors, or institutional shareholders, as "public and private pension funds, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, foundations, and endowments," or entities in 
which individual investors’ money is "professionally managed" (citations omitted)). 
 6. See Richard M. Duvall & Douglas V. Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy 
Contests, 20 J. FIN. 464, 465 (1965) (defining proxy contests as efforts launched by 
shareholders for either "minority representation on the board of directors" or "control of the 
company in which part of the ownership attempts to place the firm under new 
management"). 
 7. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Robert H. Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition By 
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 317 (1966) (defining a tender offer as "the technique 
of acquiring control of a corporation by making a public offer to purchase a part of the 
corporation’s stock at a fixed price—usually in cash and representing a premium above 
market"). 
 8. See CULPEPPER, supra note 2, at 25 ("The market for corporate control refers to the 
way in which the effective power over companies—that is, the ability to replace a senior 
management team—changes hands."). 
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breach of a director’s or officer’s duty of loyalty9 would warrant judicial 
intervention. 
Not until 1985 would a Delaware court impose director liability for 
conduct less culpable than intentional self-dealing or disloyal wrongdoing.10  
Not coincidentally, it was during that same period that the greatest 
expansion of shareholder derivative and class action litigation took place 
under Section 10(b)11 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Rule 10b-5.12  That development took place in federal courts, which were 
far more receptive to shareholder actions than state courts, including those 
of Delaware.  Not until 1977 was this creeping federalization of corporate 
law abruptly reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green.13  From that point forward, the development and 
enforcement of corporate law resided in the state courts—most notably the 
courts of Delaware, where America’s largest public corporations were, and 
still are, incorporated. 
The patient capital mindset had both bad and good impacts (or, as 
legal academics call them, "externalities").14  The bad effects were that the 
courts were largely ineffective in policing corporate managers and boards 
who took advantage of their autonomy by doing a substandard job in 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Dennis J. Block, Michael J. Maimone & Steven B. Ross, The Duty of Loyalty 
and the Evolution of the Scope of Judicial Review, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 65 (1993) 
(defining the duty of loyalty as "the obligation of corporate fiduciaries," or directors, "to act 
with disinterested independence and to exercise judgment unaffected by personal financial 
interest in making business decisions"). 
 10. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding the directors of 
a company liable for breach of fiduciary duties for failing to inform themselves of all 
reasonably available and relevant information regarding a merger, and for failing to disclose 
material information that a reasonable stockholder would consider important during a 
merger). 
 11. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006)) (allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
ban any "deceptive or manipulative devices" in connection with the "purchase or sale of any 
security" which it deems appropriate for the "protection of investors"). 
 12. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (making it "unlawful for any person . . . to 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, make any untrue statement of a material 
fact . . . or to engage in any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"). 
 13. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Absent a clear 
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the 
law of corporations . . . where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden."). 
 14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (9th ed. 2010) (defining externality as "a 
consequence or side effect of one’s economic activity, causing another to benefit . . . or 
suffer"). 
"PATIENT CAPITAL" 1649 
managing the firm.  The good effects were that the same freedom from 
being forced to manage the firm for the short-term gave American 
enterprises breathing space to innovate new products, to bring those 
products to market, and to plan for the long-term without pressure from 
investors or stock analysts to produce a short-term return on their invested 
capital.  It is precisely for that reason—because capital was "patient"—that 
the United States was able, for so long, to retain its post-war position as the 
largest and most productive economy in the world.  
Unfortunately, the United States is on the brink of losing that premier 
position, if it has not already.  Beginning in the 1970s, and with 
accelerating velocity from and after 2000, the economies of the United 
States and many Western European countries have been in a gradual 
decline, both internally and in relation to emerging economies such as 
China and India.  That is attributable to a multitude of causes, which 
include a globalized economy; noncompetitive, high U.S. labor costs; 
multi-trillion dollar domestic government deficits; profligate borrowing to 
cover those deficits; underinvestment in research, development, and public 
education; export of, and failure to protect, critical technology; and 
dysfunctional tax and currency policies.  Having no expertise in these areas, 
I make no pretense of being able to analyze precise causes and effects at the 
macroscopic level.  All I can do is identify this mix of causes to frame the 
context for focusing on one additional—and highly significant—
contributing cause: the decline (if not outright disappearance) of patient 
capital and the substitution, in its place, of impatient capital, driven by 
parallel pressures from investors and the stock analyst community to 
generate short-term profits.  It is to this development that I devote the rest 
of this Lecture. 
The thesis and claim of this Lecture is that the impatient capital 
problem needs to be fixed.  To do that, changes in current U.S. corporate 
law are needed to allow this country to reverse the decline in its economic 
power in a world of global competition.  The reason is that the one 
competitive advantage that the United States still has is the ability to 
innovate—to create new technologies and new industries that can be 
centered and grown at home, rather than being offshored to other countries 
with lower labor and regulatory costs.  But the innovation of new ideas and 
their translation into products that can be sold competitively worldwide 
requires capital—patient capital.  And for patient capital to thrive, corporate 
law needs to be altered to create a more nurturing environment. 
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B.  Decline of the U.S. Economy in the Post-1970 Era of Increasingly 
Impatient Capital 
1.  Changes in the Macroscopic Economic Environment 
The decades from and after the 1970s have witnessed a radical 
transformation of the value systems and the processes by which public 
corporations are managed.  Several elements have combined to cause that 
transformation.  One major element is the "deretailization" of the American 
securities market, which has changed the character and mindset of public 
company shareholders and their willingness to invest for the long-term.15  A 
second is securities market and compensation practices that incentivize both 
corporate and institutional investor managers to manage their firms for the 
short-term. 
To understand deretailization, an important background fact is that, in 
1960, most stockholders were individual, end-user, retail investors.  In 
1951, individual retail investors owned over 75% of all outstanding 
corporate equities in the United States.16  By 1979, institutional investors as 
a group owned over 36%.17  Today, institutional investors, including public 
and private pension and retirement funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, 
control nearly 70%.18  Those institutional investors are managed by persons 
or firms whose compensation depends on generating short-term returns 
from the portfolio company shares under fund management.  Those 
arrangements motivate these institutional investors to exert significant 
pressure on corporate managements and boards to deploy corporate assets 
and develop business strategies that will yield short-term profits, often at 
the expense of the long-term.  
That, however, is not the only reason for the short-term perspective of 
these powerful institutions, acting in their capacity as significant 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics:  The Future of 
Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm (defining "deretailization" as "the dwindling percentage of 
retail investors," or "those who lack the sophistication or net worth to gain access to 
institutional markets," from both "key existing markets" and "dynamic new trading markets 
and new asset classes"). 
 16. John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile 
Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets:  An Analytical Framework, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 240 (2011). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Strine, supra note 4, at 10. 
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shareholders of their portfolio companies.  Another reason is that they hold 
their shares only for a short period of time.  Today, the rate of turnover, or 
"churning," of invested portfolio stock is extremely high.  The annual 
turnover of investments made by hedge funds is about 300% annually.19  At 
actively managed mutual funds, which constitute the primary investor of 
American 401(k) retirement funds, the annual turnover is about 100%.20  
Viewing it from an even broader standpoint, in 2008, the average turnover 
of all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was 138% 
per year.21  Exacerbating this trend is the strategy employed by many 
activist hedge funds—to hold their stock for a short period of time and 
create pressure on boards to adopt short-term policies that will yield an 
immediate profit.  It is increasingly the case that the "agenda setters in 
corporate policy discussions are highly leveraged hedge funds that have no 
long-term commitment to the corporations in which they invest."22 
To paraphrase an observation made by Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. in 
a recent article, the blue chip institutional investors, which control 70% of 
our publicly traded companies, are "more short-term speculators" than 
"committed, long-term investors."23  Professor Lawrence Mitchell’s 
characterization is even more pungent.  Mitchell argues that this trend has 
transformed the stock market from "a place for investment to a highly 
sophisticated gambling den."24  One thing is clear—stockholders of public 
companies are no longer passive, patient investors, as was the case during 
the so-called "golden era." 
The short-termism of corporate shareholders is not the only force 
causing corporate managements to govern for the short-term.  There are 
other contributing forces including, quite notably, executive compensation 
arrangements and pressures exerted by the stock analyst community.  It is 
no secret that most corporate executives are compensated with a package of 
cash and stock, weighted (for tax reasons) most heavily in favor of stock 
and stock options.  That creates a clear and direct pocketbook financial 
incentive for corporate executives to manage their companies in a way 
designed to increase the stock price, or at least do nothing that will cause 
the stock price to go down.  That incentive is amplified by stock analysts 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. at 12.  
 23. Id. at 11. 
 24. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace:  A Cautionary Essay for 
Our Time, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 180 (2009). 
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who microscopically scrutinize reported quarterly earnings statements to 
see whether the quarterly results meet management projections.  If they do 
not, the result is an adverse analyst report (the moral equivalent of a bad 
grade) that is usually followed by a sell recommendation that sends the 
stock price downward. 
There is an old saw called the Harvard Law of Animal Behavior, 
which is: under perfectly controlled conditions, animals do as they damn 
well please.25  There is another, which applies more broadly, known as the 
Texas A&M Law of Human Behavior, and goes something like this: under 
any conditions, people, including corporate managers, do whatever they are 
paid to do.  If they are not paid to manage their companies for the long-
term, then they will not.  In today’s environment, corporate managers and 
boards have little incentive to manage for the long-term.  They are not 
rewarded financially for doing so.  Moreover, they continually operate 
under the shadow (i.e., the implied threat) of a proxy contest—of being 
ousted at the next annual meeting if they deviate from the short-term 
agendas of their large institutional stockholders.  Even without any threat of 
a proxy contest, for companies that have a majority vote requirement, there 
is the threat of a campaign to deny board incumbents the majority vote 
needed for their reelection. 
2.  Changes in the Legal Environment 
Just as state and federal corporate law mirrored and supported the 
larger macroscopic economic structure that encouraged patient capital 
during the first twenty-five years after World War II, those bodies of law 
now mirror and support the structural changes that have led to the opposite 
state of affairs—our current world of impatient capital.  Those structural 
changes are numerous.  They include the advent of the hostile tender offer 
and defenses thereto; developments at the state and federal levels requiring 
boards to be independent of, and sometimes adversarial to, corporate 
managements; and legal developments that empower shareholders to force 
corporate boards and managements to be more responsive to their 
immediate agendas.  A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. 
Just as the past four decades have witnessed the evolution to a world 
of activist shareholders, so too have they witnessed a parallel evolution to a 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE:  THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 
177 (2002) ("Under controlled experimental conditions of temperature, time, lighting, 
feeding, and training, the organism will behave as it damned well pleases.").  
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world of activist boards that are now required to be independent of their 
managements.  That evolution began gradually and then swiftly accelerated, 
at both the state and federal levels, after 2000. 
These changes began in the mid-1980s, initially in the context of 
hostile takeovers.  In the mid-1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
Smith v. Van Gorkom,26 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,27 and Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.28  All three cases demanded 
independent, active director involvement with, and oversight of, the merger 
and acquisition process.  In Van Gorkom, an independent board was held 
financially liable for approving a merger of their company without having 
obtained a valuation of the company, and for relying solely on the advice of 
the CEO—who negotiated the deal without the board’s involvement—that 
the merger terms were fair.29  In Unocal, the court held that a target 
company board has both the power and the duty to take defensive measures 
against hostile takeover bids that it reasonably believes will threaten the 
welfare of the enterprise and the shareholders.30  Finally, in MacMillan, the 
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a merger agreement approved by a 
board that passively delegated the entire competitive bidding process, with 
no independent board oversight, to the senior management group that was 
one of two bidders competing to acquire the company.31  
At this early stage, the director independence theme of these and other 
Delaware decisions was narrowly focused.  The central message was 
simply that directors whose company was being sold must not be 
subservient to management, and, in that specific context, a court will give 
far more deference to decisions made by a board controlled by independent 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding the directors of 
a company liable for breach of fiduciary duties for failing to inform themselves of all 
reasonably available and relevant information regarding a merger, and for failing to disclose 
material information that a reasonable stockholder would consider important during a 
merger). 
 27. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985) 
(finding that a corporation’s board of directors may undertake defensive measures to a 
pending takeover bid if the board feels the offer is not in the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders, and if such measures are reasonable in relation to the threat posed). 
 28. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) 
(finding the provisions of a merger agreement invalid because a lack of oversight by the 
board of directors "tainted the design and execution of the transaction").  
 29. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–81.  
 30. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.   
 31. See MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1282 (finding that "legal complications" to a 
transaction are necessarily "intensified" without "board planning and oversight to insulate 
the self-interested management from the bidding process").  
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directors than to one dominated by insiders.  After 2000, however, that 
bounded view of director independence became subsumed by a far broader 
and overriding mandate, legislated by the U.S. Congress in the wake of 
Enron and other related scandals.  That new law created a world that 
requires activist, independent directors to dominate public company boards.  
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,32 and the implementing Rules of the SEC 
and the stock exchanges, now mandate director independence for all 
companies required to register with the SEC, which means almost all U.S. 
public companies.  Under the NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, publicly 
held company boards must have a majority of independent directors, and 
their audit and compensation committees must consist entirely of 
independent directors.33  
To be clear, my claim is not that this development is bad.  This talk is 
not intended as a screed against director independence.  Many of those 
reforms have helped to reduce the evils caused by CEO-dominated boards.  
But, there has also come an unforeseen cost.  The Exchange Rules’ strict 
definition of who does and does not constitute an "independent" director 
has become a centripetal force—it has made boards less cohesive and has 
disqualified from board service many persons who are knowledgeable of 
the firm’s business, the relevant industry, and who would otherwise be an 
available resource to help companies plan for the long-term.34  
The most significant structural changes, in my view, have been legal 
developments that empower shareholders to force corporate boards and 
managements to be more responsive to their immediate agendas, however 
short-term those agendas may be.  Ironically, these developments, if viewed 
by themselves, are reforms that have significant merit and have been 
welcomed by the shareholder and academic communities.  Two of these 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. (2006)) (attempting to 
protect investors by "improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to securities laws"). 
 33. N.Y. Stock Exch. Euronext, Listed Company Manual, §§ 303.A04, A05, A07, 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4
%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter NYSE Manual] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); THE 
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 4350(c)–(d) (2004), available 
at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf.  
 34. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the 
American Corporate Governance System:  Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One 
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 967 (2003) (observing that "the tighter standards of 
independence . . . may well render directors currently categorized as independent unable to 
serve on key board committees"). 
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reforms are particularly important: the increased use of the shareholder 
bylaw process to limit the power of boards to adopt governance rules, 
including takeover defenses; and the new rules governing proxy access and 
proxy reimbursement. 
For several years, the activist shareholder community has sought to 
influence the governance of publicly held corporations through the bylaw 
amendment process.  The Delaware General Corporation Law35 expressly 
confers upon the shareholders the power to adopt and amend bylaws, while 
providing that the board cannot eliminate or limit that power.36  For the last 
decade, institutional shareholders have used that authority to limit the 
board’s power to adopt poison pills.37  Usually, this is done by adopting a 
bylaw which provides that any board-adopted pill will have a fixed duration 
and will require a shareholder vote to adopt any new pill or revive an 
expired one.38 
The same process has been utilized to reform the proxy election 
system to require the corporation to reimburse the expenses of any 
shareholder group that nominates a "short slate"39 of candidates that are 
then successfully elected to the board.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2010) (establishing corporation law in 
Delaware).  
 36. See id. § 109(a) ("After a corporation other than a nonstock corporation has 
received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall 
be in the stockholders entitled to vote.").  Furthermore, the "directors or governing 
body . . . shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their power to 
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws."  Id. 
 37. See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and 
Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 205 (2005) ("[O]ver the last decade shareholders 
have sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access to the 
corporate proxy materials to nominate directors.").  Poison pills are  
the most potent of antitakeover defenses.  If a corporation has a poison pill and a 
hostile bidder acquires enough of the corporation’s shares to trigger the pill, 
other shareholders will have the right to buy more shares at below-market 
prices, meaning that the bidder must buy those shares as well.  Alternatively, the 
pill could trigger the right to purchase more shares of the bidder at low prices 
after a merger has occurred, diluting the value of the bidder’s current 
shareholdings. 
Id. at 209.  
 38. See id. at 210 (noting that shareholders have used bylaws to limit poison pills by 
requiring "boards to redeem existing pills under certain circumstances, while others required 
shareholder approval for putting new pills in place"). 
 39. See J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access:  Delaware’s 
Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 430 
(2011) (explaining that dissident shareholders often seek a minority representation on a 
board of directors by running a short slate).  
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recently held that any bylaw that defines the process or procedure by which 
substantive board decisions are made is a proper subject for shareholder 
action; and those bylaws will not impermissibly infringe the board’s power 
to manage the affairs of the corporation, so long as the bylaw does not limit 
the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties.40  That decision legitimized the 
shareholder bylaw process as a tool in the arsenal of activist shareholders to 
alter the composition of the board and, thus, to exert leverage to influence 
business decisions. 
Those proxy reform tools have now been enacted into legislation at 
both the state and federal levels.  In 2009, the Delaware Legislature adopted 
Sections 11241 and 11342 of the General Corporation Law.  Section 112 
creates proxy access for shareholder groups urging the election of their 
nominated, dissident slate.  This statute allows bylaws to prescribe the 
conditions and procedures for when these shareholder groups’ proxy 
materials can be included in the company’s solicitation materials that are 
sent to shareholders in support of the board’s director nominee slate.43  For 
dissident shareholder groups that want to conduct their own proxy 
solicitation, Section 113 permits the adoption of bylaws that authorize the 
corporation to reimburse the dissident group’s proxy solicitation expenses, 
under prescribed conditions.44  These statutes further provide that, where 
shareholders adopt such bylaws, the directors cannot repeal them.45 
What Delaware law made merely optional, the U.S. Congress has now 
made mandatory in the Dodd-Frank Act.46  Section 971 of Dodd-Frank 
authorizes the SEC to adopt proxy access rules.47  In September 2010, the 
SEC adopted proposed Rule 14a-11 by a 3-2 vote.48  If and when Rule 14a-
                                                                                                                 
 40. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).  
 41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009) ("The bylaws may provide that if the 
corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it may be required . . . to 
include in its proxy solicitation materials . . . 1 or more individuals nominated by a 
stockholder."). 
 42. See id. § 113 (allowing shareholders to adopt bylaws that reimburse "expenses 
incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection with an election of directors"). 
 43. Id. § 112. 
 44. Id. § 113. 
 45. See id. § 109 ("After a corporation other than a nonstock corporation has received 
any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
stockholders entitled to vote."). 
 46. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing financial regulatory reform). 
 47. Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915. 
 48. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249) (announcing the 
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11 becomes effective, it would require public companies, in certain 
circumstances, to include shareholders’ board nominees in the company’s 
proxy solicitation, and would amend SEC Rule 14a-8 to require companies, 
in specified circumstances, to include shareholder proposals regarding 
director nomination procedures in their proxy materials.49  No opt out from 
these rules is allowed.50  Moreover, Rule14a-11 preempts state law to the 
extent that state law would "prohibit inclusion of shareholder director 
nominees in company proxy materials or set share ownership or other terms 
that are more restrictive than Rule 14a-11 under which shareholder director 
nominees will be included in company proxy materials."51  Currently, 
proposed Rule 14a-11 is not effective because it was recently challenged by 
the Business Roundtable and vacated in federal court on procedural 
grounds.52  Regardless, the Rule will be resurrected at some future point in 
one form or another. 
In today’s world, the shareholders of public companies are highly 
motivated to influence the company’s board and executives to govern for 
the short-term.  The current American corporation law, at both the state and 
federal level, gives those shareholders powerful tools to exert that 
influence.  The boards and executives that wish to manage their businesses 
for the long-term have little power to resist.  In my view, this has created a 
national problem that needs to be fixed. 
C.  The Problem 
In a world of global competition, this country (and much of Western 
Europe) is losing out to countries with lower labor costs.  The question is 
how the United States can meet that competition.  It will not be done by 
lowering our labor costs because it is unlikely that the American labor 
force, whether blue or white collar, would be willing, voluntarily, to lower 
its standard of living to compete head-on with workers in lower-standard-
of-living societies, such as China, India, and other developing economies.  
To compete successfully, the United States needs to develop new products 
                                                                                                                 
adoption of Rule 14a-11). 
 49. Id. at 56,668.  
 50. See id. at 56,674. 
 51. Id. at 56,678. 
 52. See Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm., 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (finding that the SEC acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" in "fail[ing] once 
again . . . to assess the economic effects of [Rule 14a-11].").   
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and services that the world’s consumers will buy, regardless of high price, 
because those products are needed and no one else has yet developed them.  
Stated differently, the United States needs to exploit its competitive 
advantage, and the most important (perhaps only) advantage we have is our 
ability to innovate.  The problem is that innovation takes time.  It takes time 
to develop an idea from the drawing board to a marketable product.  And, it 
takes invested capital that is willing to stand still for that time before 
realizing a return.  Thus, the problem is that the United States needs to find 
a way to encourage and nurture patient capital in an investment 
environment that is structurally unreceptive to being patient.  The question 
then becomes, how can we do that? 
One can imagine an entire spectrum of possible approaches.  The most 
extreme approach would be for Congress to federalize this entire subject 
area by enacting, wholesale, an array of new laws that would discourage, if 
not prevent, investors from pressuring managements to govern for the 
short-term.  This would effectively convert most, if not all, invested capital 
into patient capital.  The problem with that approach, however, is that it 
would require preempting most state corporate law, radically amending 
existing federal securities law, and completely disrupting the capital 
markets and the legitimate expectations of investors who have invested in 
reliance on the existing set of institutions and rules.  The resulting 
dislocation would be not only undesirable, but also politically impossible.  
This radical approach would also raise serious constitutional issues, such as 
abrogation of contract rights.  Thus, a comprehensive and preemptive 
federal solution is neither realistic nor beneficial; however, this is far from 
saying that the federal government should not play a role.  In fact, no 
reform of any kind will be possible without federal cooperation.  But the 
solution will have to be more modest and less far reaching to be workable. 
The solution I propose would start at the state law level.  It would 
amend the corporate statutes of Delaware and of other states (including the 
Model Business Corporation Act states) to give existing corporations the 
authority to adopt a charter provision abolishing yearly elections of 
directors.  In place thereof, the board would be elected to serve for a longer 
period, such as five years.  During that period, the board could not be 
removed by shareholders except for cause.  Moreover, the directors would 
be authorized to adopt defenses against any takeover bids they view, 
reasonably and in good faith, as being contrary to the best interests of the 
corporation.  The objective would be to liberate the directors to manage the 
firm for the longer term required to create and develop the innovative 
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products and services that would enable the American economy to become 
competitive again. 
In all candor, this idea is not original.  The key concept was proposed 
ten years ago, in an article that I co-authored with former Delaware 
Chancellor William T. Allen and current Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr.53  
That article was written with a far narrower context and purpose.  At that 
time, the issue we were confronting was:  on what principled basis should 
corporate boards be allowed to defend against a hostile bid—even one that 
is non-coercive, at a significant premium, and would prevent their own 
shareholders from realizing a short-term profit.54  In Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time Warner),55 the Delaware Supreme 
Court permitted the Time Warner board to do just that, on the ground that 
where a corporate board has a long-term strategy for generating corporate 
wealth, it is not required to forgo that strategy in favor of an unsolicited 
takeover bid merely because it would generate a short-term profit.56  
As discussed in that now dated article, Time Warner and other 
Delaware takeover decisions were merely a surface manifestation of a more 
fundamental debate taking place in the academy and the corporate 
community.  The fundamental issue was what is the purpose of the 
corporation.  Specifically, whose interests is the corporation intended to 
advance—the interests of shareholders that have committed their capital to 
the firm for a long period of time or the interests of the shareholders at the 
specific time the takeover bid occurs?57  The answer depends (we 
concluded) on which of two competing conceptions of the corporation the 
law should embrace: the entity conception,58 which posits that the purpose 
of the corporation is long-term wealth maximization for all corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See generally William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great 
Takeover Debate:  A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1067 (2002).  
 54. See id. at 1067. 
 55. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) 
(establishing that "a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, 
is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the 
context of a takeover"). 
 56. See id. at 1154 ("Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived 
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain 
the corporate strategy."). 
 57. Allen et al., supra note 53, at 1071.   
 58. See id. at 1076 (stating that the entity approach "views the corporation as a societal 
institution whose purpose is broader than simply serving the ends of those who own stock"). 
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constituencies; or the property model,59 under which the board’s only 
mandate is to advance the interests of the stockholders.  Those two models 
are at war with each other, and Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence has 
embraced neither model in its entirety.  Because that debate was so laden 
with policy implications, as to be unavoidably legislative in character, we 
predicted that the courts were not likely to resolve that debate.60  Thus, we 
proposed a solution to help bridge the gap between these models. 
The solution we proposed was that corporate boards would be elected 
every three years, rather than annually, and during that period the board 
would not be subject to removal without cause.61  This solution would give 
boards the space to think and plan for the long-term, while furthering the 
interests of the subset of investors who think and plan for the long-term.62  
In exchange for that greater insulation from the yearly electoral process, the 
director election process would be made fairer by affording access to the 
company’s proxy machinery to all nominees having the support of a 
significant block of stock (we suggested from 5% to 8%).63  This reform 
would give shareholders a meaningful opportunity to decide who should be 
on the board and thereby ensure board accountability to both long-term and 
short-term shareholders.  
The proposal for which I argue today is a variation of that 2001 
proposal, but its context and purpose are entirely different.  Ten years ago 
the focus was more academic than pragmatic.  At that point in time there 
was no broader macroeconomic focus because the United States was not yet 
a loser in a globalized, competitive economy.  Today, the environment has 
radically changed because we have (or will have) mandatory proxy access 
and optional proxy reimbursement.  Yet, we still continue to have annual 
elections, with their adverse impact on the incentives of corporate 
managements and boards to plan and innovate for the long-term.  Today, 
we are losing out in the globalized economy, and therefore need patient 
capital to enable us to compete effectively.  Accordingly, my proposal—
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. at 1074–75 ("The property school strongly believes that capital markets, 
while not perfect, are generally efficient, and that the overall wealth of society will be 
enhanced in the long term if corporate control can be transferred relatively freely between 
buyers and sellers."). 
 60. Id. at 1073–74.  
 61. See id. at 1073 ("[O]nce elected, [directors] would serve guaranteed three-year 
terms, and would be subject to removal without cause only at the next shareholders’ 
meeting."). 
 62. Id. at 1100.   
 63. Id. at 1072.   
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giving corporations the authority to provide for board elections every five 
years—borrows from our 2001 proposal, but for a totally different purpose.  
I submit that this proposal would be politically feasible because it is 
modest.  I make no claim, however, that it would be perfect or free from 
obstacles.  Objections would be raised that will need to be addressed. 
II.  The Solution 
There are three major obstacles to this proposal.  The first is whether 
investors will be willing to invest in companies that elect directors every 
five years.  There are two scenarios where this problem will arise: the start-
up company that has not yet gone public, and the corporation that is already 
publicly held.  This question has both legal and economic aspects.  The 
legal issue is whether the stock of the company, under either scenario, can 
even be listed on a national securities exchange.  Under the current 
Exchange Listing Rules, it could not, because both the NYSE and 
NASDAQ Listing Rules require listed companies to have an annual 
stockholders meeting.64  Consequently, the Exchange Listing Rules would 
have to be changed to permit the stock of those companies that opt into this 
system to be listed.  That, in turn, will require the approval of the SEC, 
which regulates the Exchanges, and most likely will require the SEC to 
adopt a Rule addressing that subject.  
The economic question is whether investors would be willing to make 
an investment where they would risk having to forgo a return for possibly 
up to five years.  To that question I suggest two answers.  The first is that 
they would be willing to invest if the upside gain exceeds the risk—that is, 
if the innovation is sufficiently promising (think Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, 
or Intel).  A second response is that, in cases where the risk-reward calculus 
is too unclear to predict, the federal government can reduce the risk (and 
perhaps state governments as well) by creating appropriate tax incentives.  
For decades, American tax policy has been deployed to encourage 
investment in specific new economic areas.  What has been done before 
can, and should, be done again. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See NYSE Manual, supra note 33, § 302.00 ("Listed companies are required to 
hold an annual shareholders’ meeting during each fiscal year."); THE NASDAQ STOCK 
MARKET, INC., MEETINGS OF SHAREHOLDERS § 5620(a) (2009), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Listing_Rules_041309.pdf ("Each Company listing common 
stock or voting preferred stock, and their equivalents, shall hold an annual meeting of 
Shareholders no later than one year after the end of the Company’s fiscal year-end.").  
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A second major objection will be that existing institutional investors 
would have a strong interest in voting down any proposals to amend 
corporate charters to change the board election system from a one to a five-
year regime.  Again, I suggest two responses.  First, if the boards proposing 
the charter amendment can articulate innovative lines of business that 
promise a significant return in five years or less, they may be able to 
persuade their institutional stockholders to support the proposal on purely 
economic grounds.  A second inducement might be an agreement to do 
away with a staggered board (for companies that have one), because in a 
world where directors are elected every five years, a three-year staggered 
election system becomes superfluous.  For those companies that are not far 
along in their innovative thinking, but would like the breathing space to go 
further down that road, a solution would be to create a wholly owned 
subsidiary whose charter provides for a five-year board election.  Then, 
have the subsidiary conduct an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of a minority 
block of the subsidiary’s stock.  A board has the power to form a subsidiary 
and then "take it public" without shareholder approval.65 
The third principal objection would run like this: the proposed solution 
is unlikely to work satisfactorily because it merely chips away at the 
problem without addressing it head-on. The fundamental problem is that the 
institutional investor community no longer thinks like the end-user 
investors that they serve.  The end-user investors (i.e., you and I) want our 
investments to grow for the long-term to fund our childrens’ college 
educations and our retirement.  But, the institutional investors who manage 
our retirement plans and other investments are interested mainly in the 
short-term.  Unless the proposal includes some way to change the mindset 
of the institutional investors, it is basically swimming upstream against a 
very strong current. 
There is force to that objection.  It is correct that the major problem is 
the short-term mindset of the American institutional investor community.  
And I agree that if there were some way to wave a magic wand and 
proselytize those institutions into a new religion of long-term patient 
capitalists, that would be the optimal approach, but there is no magic wand.  
In a recent article published in The Business Lawyer, Chancellor Strine 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (establishing the default rule that "[t]he 
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors").  Thus, unless a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation or Delaware law say otherwise, the board has the power to execute and 
enforce decisions that affect the business and affairs of the corporation without the 
shareholder’s approval.  Id. 
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made the excellent point that it is past time to begin "addressing the 
misalignment between the interests of end-user investors . . . and the 
incentives of the institutional investor community to think and act 
myopically."66  He then identified nine different regulatory reforms for 
consideration.67  Chancellor Strine’s proposed reforms would go a 
considerable way towards solving this fundamental problem, if there were a 
realistic prospect of their adoption.  The problem, however, is that his 
proposals would require new top-down federal legislation that would 
amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act)68 and change the 
current implementing SEC Rules along with new federal securities 
legislation and new SEC Rules to cover institutional investors not subject to 
the 1940 Act.  In the current environment, this seems highly unlikely.  To 
accomplish that, political pressure from the ground up would be needed to 
persuade the political branches to make those changes from the top down.  
In short, it would be a mistake to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the 
good.  My proposal is far from perfect, but because it is feasible, it is (at 
least) good. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Strine, supra note 4, at 18. 
 67. The nine reforms include:  (1) pricing and tax strategies to encourage investing 
and discourage churning by institutional investors and "fund hopping" by end-user investors; 
(2) enhanced requirements for institutional investors to factor concern about fundamental 
risk, leverage, and legal compliance into their investing and corporate governance decisions; 
(3) requirements that investment manager compensation be aligned with the investment 
horizons of end-user investors; (4) considering a mandated separation of funds managing 
401(k) and college savings investments from more liquid investments, and requiring 
investing practices consistent with retirement and college investment objectives; 
(5) requirements that index funds vote shares and engage in activism in a manner consistent 
with the funds’ commitment to hold the entire benchmark index; (6) leverage limitations, 
broader disclosure, and other regulations for hedge funds that decrease the ability and 
incentive of those funds to effectively push public corporations into risky business decisions; 
(7) mandating that institutional investors disclose fuller and more timely information about 
their economic interests (including their ownership of derivatives and short positions) and 
about their voting and lending policies; (8) restoring the sophisticated investor exception, 
and requiring pension, charitable, and governmental investment funds to invest only through 
investment advisors covered by the 1940 Act; and (9) prohibiting pension, charitable, and 
governmental investment funds from relying on the advice of proxy advisory services unless 
those services give voting advice based on the economic perspective and goals of an investor 
intending to hold her stock for at least five years.  Id. at 18–19. 
 68. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-51 to 80a-64 (2006) 
(creating comprehensive financial regulation primarily regarding investment companies and 
security exchanges). 
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III.  Conclusion 
We can no longer afford to allow the capital markets to be the dog that 
wags our portfolio corporations as the tail.  Although this proposal will not 
solve the institutional investor short-term mindset problem, it would be a 
modest, bottom-up step towards generating the consensus needed to 
persuade the political branches of our national government to initiate the 
top-down changes that will be needed for a long-term solution. 
